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On Covidiots and Covexperts: 











The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the significance of the politics of health as an ongoing 
interpretative event. The effectiveness of delivering prevention strategies is in negotiation with 
day-to-day arguments in the public sphere, not just by “experts” in peer-reviewed papers, but 
also in the everyday interpretations and discussions of available expertise on print and digital 
media platforms. In this paper, I explore a particular facet of these public debate over the politics 
of health: the deployment of the commonplace of stupidity. I argue that the growth of this 
commonplace within discussion is rooted in particular models of interpretation which limit self-
understanding, by over-emphasising certain points of significance within the interpretative 






Stupidity, agnotology, knowledge, expertise, post-truth, uncertainty 
 
Analysing the advent of what he terms our current “Burnout Society,” Byung-Chul Han points to 
the problematic role of immunology as a framework for interpretation. “The past century was an 
immunological age,” he argues. “The epoch sought to distinguish clearly between inside and 
outside, friend and foe, self and other. […] The object of immune defense is the foreign as such.” 
(2015, pp. 1-2) The “fundamental category” of immunology is the Other (2015, p. 2), and 
immunization has thus served as an interpretative category which links together otherwise 
disparate concerns in medicine, politics, and technology (see Esposito, 2011, p. 1). Yet for Han, 
this immunological model is insufficient to describe the workings of 21st century late capitalism 
with its globalised networks and dissolution of boundaries. If the model of immunology leads to 
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disciplinary responses – the type of organisational control which was described so well by 
Foucault’s account of institutions such as hospitals and factories – for Han, we now live in an 
“achievement society.” Here, negative control is replaced by an excess of positivity, and 
“prohibitions, commandments, and the law are replaced by projects, initiatives, and motivation.” 
(2015, p. 9) The problem is no longer an external Other, but rather the demands of self-fulfilment 
requiring immune responses to be suppressed “so that information will circulate faster and 
capital will accelerate” (2017, p. 83). Amid the mass exchange of knowledge via communication 
networks which are no longer concerned with borders and have absorbed all forms of otherness, 
Han suggests “the idiot, the fool” – the one who performs an “inner contraction of thinking to 
make a new beginning,” who “wants to turn the absurd into the highest power of thought” – has 
“all but vanished from society.” (2017, pp. 81-82) The idiot, Han argues, being “un-networked 
and uninformed,” would stand opposed to “the neoliberal power of domination: total 
communication and total surveillance” (83); if only the achievement society allowed for the 
stupid.  
 
It is fair to say that the COVID-19 pandemic has necessarily and pointedly re-introduced 
immunology into our models of thinking, while simultaneously retaining the hallmarks of Han’s 
achievement society. Consequently, it should be no surprise the extent to which the pandemic 
has highlighted the significance of the politics of health as an ongoing interpretative event. That 
is to say: the effectiveness of health delivery is in negotiation with day-to-day arguments in the 
public sphere, not just by “experts” in peer-reviewed papers, but also (and perhaps 
predominantly) in the everyday interpretations and discussions of available expertise on print and 
digital media platforms. There is no separation of communication networks. Hence, the 
emergence of a pandemic of a previously unseen virus is not only, as Carley et al. suggest, 
“arguably […] one of the greatest challenges to EBM [Evidence-Based Medicine] since the term 
was coined” (2020, p. 572). For clinicians, they note that the emergence of a new pandemic in a 
digital age is problematic because of: 
 
the sheer volume of new “evidence” that we are faced with. On the one hand, this 
research can be both informative and hypothesis generating, but on the other hand, it is 
prone to selective promotion and can overwhelm the user by the nature of volume and the 
frequency of publication. (Carley et al., 2020, p. 574) 
 
The same issue is at hand in the public discussion of how best to deal with the virus: the lack of 
clear and well-established protocols, the variations in approaches taken by different countries, 
and, particularly of note in the UK, the ways in which its key themes – global travel and border 
control, state-sanctioned lockdown and welfare provision, considerations of society’s 
“vulnerable” and the legacy of downgraded public health investment – interweave into existing 
political arguments. As a result, discussion amongst the “general public” around whether to 
accept or reject a particular health intervention frequently take place in the same public forums, 
and particularly on social media, in which these existing political debates take place. In this way, 
one can easily suggest that the decisions made by members of the public whether to wear a mask, 
whether to visit a general practice, and whether to conform to social distancing rules is mediated 
at least in part by interpretations of the volume, frequency, and promotion of certain views, on 
social media no less than in the world of EBM. Precisely because of this, the debate over public 
health and individual behaviour within the COVID-19 pandemic has been framed by the longer-
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term interrelationship between politics and health (see Bambra et al., 2005; Oliver, 2006) and, in 
this case, in particular the critical discussion over the role of expertise in the times digital media 
saturation, one which has challenged the health professions as much as any other (see, for 
example, Hawkes, 2017; Heinrich, 2020; Hopf et al., 2019). This is what Paul and Haddad 
describe as a “new truth regime, [where] politics seems to have unilaterally withdrawn from the 
social contract and appears to operate, once again, primarily on the basis of a stubborn will to 
ignorance and blatant forms of denial” (2019, p. 300). 
 
What, though, of Han’s “idiot”? Do they return, like the immunological model, and if so, in what 
form? In this paper, I want to explore a particular facet of these public debate over the politics of 
health, or rather, a particular commonplace line of reasoning, a particular topic of discussion 
which situates COVID-19 at the centre of the so-called “post-truth” mediasphere battleground. 
This is the deployment of the commonplace of stupidity. As with any discussion of the pandemic 
in 2020 and 2021, my paper here can only be schematic at this point: we lack any finality, and 
the interpretative connections I want to suggest may yet take unexpected turns. Nevertheless, the 
role of stupidity in public debate has been an increasingly febrile one. The interpretative 
distinction between the stupid and the intelligent, the unreflective with the rational and the 
conspiratorial with the informed has long been found in arguments against the more general, pre-
COVID “anti-vaxxers,” the United States presidential elections in both 2016 and 2020, and, 
either side of the Brexit divide in the United Kingdom. It is within the context of COVID-19, 
though, that specific questions for applied hermeneutics are brought to the fore.  
 
It seems appropriate to illustrate the commonplace of stupidity through some examples of their 
primary vehicle for communication, the internet meme.  
 
 





These are images and texts that are easily shared and viewed, at speed, across digital media 
platform, in order to spread a message or viewpoint. In this way, the internet meme operates on a 
level of what Aristotle termed the enthymeme: that is, a unit of cultural transmission embedded 
within an audience’s ability to accept similarities across situations (see Grimwood, 2021, p.180). 
Similarly, memes appeal to the manifestation what Gadamer turns to as the sensus communis 
underlying interpretative judgement (2004, pp. 28-29). In this sense, these meme examples 
appeal to a clear argument: following science is the antithesis to being stupid. Those who do not 
“follow the science” are, therefore, stupid. Accompanying the concern for the decline in the 
value of expertise, and the associated ascent of fake news and post-truth, the line is very clearly 
drawn in social media between those with intellect and those without, those committed to the 
value of fact over the allure of conspiracy. In such a context, the aim of the arguments around 
applied responses to the pandemic revolves around an established commonplace of digital 
rhetoric, encapsulated in a popular pre-COVID meme which asserted “science: it reduces the 
stupid.” 
 
The Ethos of the Stupid 
 
Isn’t this obvious? Perhaps too obvious: the readymade accessibility of this form of critique 
renders stupidity a cliché. It is merely stating what we (the non-stupid) already know; the 
equivalent of showing a picture of a globe to a flat-earther (and typically with much the same 
effect; that is, none). But much like the use of clichés, something more is being appealed to than 
tautology. If the medium for these accusations is often irony or humour, the sentiment is 
certainly not flippant. This is not the “oh, don’t be so stupid!” that we might say to a partner or 
sibling. Instead, the mud is very much supposed to stick. After all, in the midst of a pandemic, 
the stakes are very real: a reasonable, evidence-based approach to public health initiatives is key 
to the prevention of further spread and deaths from the virus. This is not the “idiotism” which 
Han borrows from Deleuze, a celebrated instigator of new thought by virtue of their 
idiosyncrasies (Han, 2017, p. 81). Clearly, so-called “Covidiots,” while sometimes declaring 
opposition to various notions of neoliberal domination, are nevertheless entirely networked, 
fuelled by communication access, and au fait with the language of reason and evidence. At the 
same time, the prevalence of this specific trope and its specific concern with expertise suggests it 
is something more than an ad hominem attack (even if it is that as well). And in that sense, it 
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seems right to ask: what kind of stupidity is being referred to? If, as I have already suggested, 
these accusations of COVID-19 behaviours are embedded within the wider concerns for the fate 
of expertise in contemporary culture, then what are the wider interpretative systems used to 
frame them? 
 
To complicate this question, stupidity itself bears an etymological relationship to the idea of a 
“type.” The Latin stupēre root term (to be stunned or numb) gives rise not only to stupidus, with 
its sense of stultifying astonishment, but also to typos, an impression or model, and to typtein, to 
strike or beat. In antiquity, then, stupidity carried the sense of being stunned still, whether by 
amazement or by violence. It was only in the 17th century that the notion of halting came to refer 
to a slowness of mind; and only later still that stupidity was defined as ignorance. Indeed, in the 
19th century Nietzsche describes stupidity not as an error or misunderstanding, but rather 
thoughts which are true but “base” (see Deleuze, 1962/2006, p. 98) This alignment is also at 
work in Gustave Le Bon’s The Crowd, a 1895 treatise on mass psychology, which remains so 
persuasive it is reprinted almost every year. For Le Bon, stupidity is exemplified by the 
formation of the crowd: once inside, individuals become incapable of logical argumentation, and 
instead allow their behaviours and attitudes to change via the contagion of suggestibility. This is, 
in effect, the spreading stultification of critical thought, and it is clear that on this view stupidity 
– much like a virus – needs containment and reducing. Indeed, as Ernesto Laclau has shown, Le 
Bon’s line between social organisation and mass crowds “coincides […] with the frontier 
separating the normal from the pathological” (Laclau, 2005, p. 29).  
 
Nevertheless, while Le Bon’s dated views might still be entreated in discussions of the decline of 
expertise in the face of political populism, they do not in themselves shed much light on the 
meaning of stupidity as a trope: not just because of Laclau’s argument that Le Bon woefully fails 
to account for the myriad of ways people might group together and communicate whilst also 
thinking relatively logically, but additionally because Le Bon insists that mass psychology 
requires anonymity, and the loss of self. However, the targets of the memes above are not 
anonymous; if anything, COVID-deniers and anti-vaxxers are prominent not just in identifying 
themselves, but in their displays of (apparent) reason and evidence to support their claims. It is 
perhaps for this reason that another answer to has become particularly prominent, which is the 
invocation of “confident idiocy,” or what has become known as the Dunning-Kruger effect. In a 
small experiment in social psychology, David Dunning and Justin Kruger asked participants to 
report on their confidence in carrying out a task, and then compared this to how the candidates 
actually performed. They argued that there was a direct correlation between confidence and 
performance: the more confident a participant was, the less well they had performed. The study 
concluded that incompetent people were unable, and unwilling, to acknowledge their lack of 
competence, because this would require the very expertise that they lacked; instead, they will 
become more belligerent in their view of their own abilities. Arguments by anti-vaccination 
advocates and claims that COVID-19-deniers are seen as fine illustrations of this, as the direct 
reproach to established evidence-bases is precisely what buoys the arguer. The louder one shouts 
about one’s expertise, the less one is likely to know. 
 
Unlike Le Bon, Kruger and Dunning’s work is notable for its emphasis on the individual at fault: 
arguing that “the miscalibration of the incompetent stems from an error about the self, whereas 
the miscalibration of the highly competent stems from an error about others” (1999, p. 1127, my 
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emphasis). This particular aspect of the Dunning-Kruger account of stupidity is often picked up 
by its proponents. For example, US blogger and obstetrician gynecologist Amy Tuteur, argues 
that the “disparagement of expertise may boost the self-esteem of its promoters, but often harms 
everyone else. What confident idiots know rarely represents the sum total of all knowledge on 
the subject; that’s why real expertise is worthy of respect” (Tuteur, 2016, on-line). Writing for 
Forbes, Ethan Siegel concludes that the Dunning-Kruger effect can only be challenged by a 
response based on one’s ethos rather than pathos. It: 
 
requires a kind of transformation within yourself. It means that you need to be humble, 
and admit that you, yourself, lack the necessary expertise to evaluate the science before 
you. It means that you need to be brave enough to turn to the consensus of scientific 
experts […].  If we listen to the science, we can attempt to take the best path possible 
forward through the greatest challenges facing modern society. We can choose to ignore 
it, but if we do, the consequences will only increase in severity. (Siegel, 2020, on-line) 
 
This focus on character traits serves to cement that stupid people are not simply mistaken on the 
facts, they are also morally wrong. The change to be made is within the individual, in order that 
they are better able to “listen to the science.” And clearly, in many instances of public debate, the 
emphasis on choice is one of moral imperative: to not wear a mask is to risk the lives of others; 
so is avoiding a vaccine. These are individual choices about our behaviours which have effects 
on the people around us, just as refusing to self-isolate or taking a holiday to North Wales are. In 
some cases, choice is emphasised precisely to frame an action as moral, rather than, say 
economic (as in the case, for example, of the person who refuses to self-isolate because they 
work in the gig economy and can’t afford to take the time from work). But more fundamental to 
our concerns here is the role of choice in accepting or not accepting knowledge. Inherent to this 
version of confident idiocy is a working assumption that we can pick up and use information as it 
passes us by, as we please. Therefore, if we choose wrong, we are stupid, and probably immoral 
for that.  
 
Of course, this can be very convincing, especially when faced with the stream of sometimes 
bizarre claims and conspiracy theories which one can encounter on social media regarding 
COVID-19. But the more interesting aspect of the Dunning-Kruger research is that it bears 
significant marks of the production of expertise (“real expertise” that is “worthy of respect”). For 
example, it is referred to as “Dunning-Kruger,” when the original paper has Kruger’s name first. 
But it is not the Kruger-Dunning effect, because Kruger was at the time only a graduate student, 
whilst Dunning was the professor. Hence, when the Skeptical OB blog declares in relation to the 
confidence we might have in expert views, “that’s why professional qualifications are so 
important,” the wider implications of that claim are unwittingly reflected in the Dunning-Kruger 
example: that is, the darker side of what Jason Brennan has championed as “epistocracy” 
(Brennan, 2016), or the advocacy of elite knowledge over and against democratic representation 
(McGoey, 2019). Titles matter. Furthermore, Dunning and Kruger’s original studies were of 
students at University. It is perhaps not surprising that over-confidence was a problem here: 
students who had reached tertiary education, often at great financial cost to themselves, may well 
be disposed to feeling a certain elevated confidence in their abilities. The use of students as 
participants is common practice in much social psychology simply because they are more readily 
available and easier to recruit than others, and this keeps the costs of an experiment down 
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considerably. While it is therefore problematic to scale up these findings to those participating in 
internet debates – the self-confidence of the original participants was not opposed to expertise 
but embedded in the same system that produces it – such choices of data subjects represent what 
Paul and Haddad term “convenient uncertainty” (2019, p. 306): a choice made less out of 
intentional exclusion of non-students, but rather from “agnotological convenience” (see also 
Proctor, 2008, p. 24). 
 
For some, these points are insignificant; the evidence still stands and the observation is still 
astute. However, both points demonstrate the cultural and economic aspects of expertise which a 
simple line between confidence and competence does not attend to; as well as how convention 
and tradition is a key determinant to which forms of reasoning and illustration are used. What is 
significant is that the contemporary invocation of “confident idiocy” takes place against the 
backdrop of a specific (though notoriously ill-defined; see Keane, 2013, 2018, Vogelmann, 
2018) cultural context: that of “post-truth.” This, too, is a context beset with agnotological 
convenience. The term “post-truth” has become, amid the genuine concerns over its political and 
cultural effects, a de facto victory of a positivistic certainty; and accompanying this victory is an 
industry of conferences, academic papers, and even research centres that have arisen in its wake 
to determine who are the intelligent ones and who are the confident idiots. But in this response, 
“post-truth” rather too quickly becomes merely “non-truth,” and the complexity of the “post” 
prefix is lost. Too quickly, post-truth is shaped into a shorthand straw man figure to be bested by 
conservative epistemological mantra, a figure uncannily similar to older enemies of that same 
mantra, such as radical feminism, post-modernism, or the hermeneutics of suspicion (see, for 
example, Haack, 2019). Too quickly, the complexities of “post-truth” becomes a cipher for 
nothing other than a yearning for an ideal model of academic institutions of truth and readily 
graspable “facts.”  
 
This is not to dismiss Kruger and Dunning’s argument, and certainly not to deny that ignorance 
can be damaging to public health efforts. Instead, I would argue that there are certain rituals, 
processes and cultures of knowledge production which remain at work when peer-reviewed 
research becomes the content of public debate. And if it might be tempting for the epistocrat to 
suggest that the invocation of Dunning-Kruger by a wider population leads to misrepresentation 
because, ironically, it is being utilised by non-experts, this merely repeats these rituals, processes, 
and cultures once more. As such, this case highlights the way in which a beacon of reference for 
framing “stupidity” carries with it a number of less manifest aspects of “intelligence” in our time, 
which nevertheless constitute an interpretative horizon in the Gadmerian sense of combining 
cognitive, normative, and reproductive aspects of interpretation (Gadamer, 2004, p. 309). As 
such, if we are to interpret the impact of these commonplaces of public debate on applied health 
interventions within the pandemic, then we need to attend to how such horizonal aspects 
facilitate the shorthand of “reducing the stupid” which turns epistemology into moral 
requirement: that is, what cultures and rituals are maintained or perpetuated, and what this speed 
of judgement leaves out, or steps around. 
 
Stupidity on (and in) the Horizon 
 
A prime reason that the pandemic brings this shorthand into focus is that, as Carley et al. argue, 
the pandemic provides “a time when we can experience first-hand the journey from ignorance 
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about the disease through to a better understanding and approach to diagnostics and 
interventional therapy.” (2020, p. 574) As such, one could argue that COVID-19 has shone a 
light on the processes of knowledge-production which are more usually obscured either by a 
form of site-exclusivity (hidden behind the pay walls of academic journals or the real walls of the 
university and the laboratory), or the length of time such production usually takes due to funding, 
access to resources, ethical approval, and so on, all of which has been accelerated in COVID-
related research during 2020 and 2021. Furthermore, the political machinations of evidence – 
from the micro academic rituals of Dunning-Kruger to the macro policy decisions, funding 
allocations, and presentation of data of national government (see Ashton, 2020, pp. 160-179) – 
have also been manifest. If this is the case, then it becomes increasingly clear that the invocation 
of stupidity is not a simple reliance on the “facts,” however popular the positivist revival in 
public (and large parts of academic) debate might be. The rhetoric of “the science,” in need of 
defending from the stupid, masks the complex yet entirely functional ways in which such science 
is made meaningful, and consolidated from a myriad of data into one single “the.” Or, in other 
words: to judge something as stupid requires interpretation.  
 
The word ignorance stems from the Latin ignorantia, a lack of knowledge, but its long journey – 
via Middle English and Old French – to today’s usage leaves a number of ambiguities in it. 
Arfini (2019), for example, notes that “to be ignorant” and “to ignore” are two quite distinct 
perspectives: the former suggests being uninformed or unlearned, the latter suggested an 
intentional refusal to take notice of something. This is echoed in the work of both McGoey and 
Paul and Haddad, who note in their respective fields of practice (sociology of health and policy 
studies) that rather than aligning ignorance with misinformation or falsehood, choosing to ignore 
aspects of a certain horizon can form “very tangible effects of selective processing of research-
based knowledge,” where “ignorance emerges as a by-product in knowledge-making processes.” 
(Paul & Haddad, 2019, p. 308) On these arguments, ignorance is not the “other” to knowledge, 
as the scientistic memes might suggest, but rather a material part of it. Knowledge itself depends 
on a level of “strategic ignorance,” if only to reach something like a “conclusion” in a 
manageable form. As before, this begins to reflect something like a performance of what 
Gadamer terms the ontological “effective-historical consciousness” which situate our 
interpretative acts: the horizon for understanding which is not universal in reach but rather a 
“range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” 
(Gadamer, 2004, p. 301). This fluctuating frame of reference is shaped and changed by the limits 
of our situation and knowledge, and the ways in which such knowledge is significant to us. Our 
horizons are not simply operational knowledge of the world, but also our expectations, 
projections and hopes. Like prejudice, the strategic ignorance raised by McGoey and Paul and 
Haddad is not necessarily an obstacle to understanding. It is, rather, a condition of understanding 
itself: such “fore-understanding” is “what determines what can be realised as a unified meaning 
and thus determines how the fore-conception of completeness is applied” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 
294).  
 
In this light, it is noticeable that, like many in the field, Carley et al. utilise a narrative structure 
for ignorance whereby the concept emerges from a sense of assumed completion: in other words, 
ignorance is only a step on the way to proper knowledge. Hence, this is a “journey,” not an errant 
adventure. We start with nothing, in order that we finish in possession of understanding. This 
notion of possession – from not having knowledge to having it, from not having an appropriate 
Grimwood  Journal of Applied Hermeneutics 2021Article 6    
 
9 
therapy to carrying out an intervention with it, and so on – is instructive, and not just typical of 
health research. Indeed, in analytic epistemology possession is the keystone of both dominant 
views of ignorance: what is known as the “Standard View on Ignorance” refers to it as a lack of 
knowledge (one cannot both be ignorant and have knowledge of a certain thing, whereas the 
“New View” argues that it is the absence or lack of true beliefs (one cannot be ignorant and have 
a true belief about something). Both assume that knowledge, beliefs, and truth are things that 
people possess, and subsequently excludes one from holding both at the same time. 
 
But if possession is at the centre of knowledge, it cannot be a literal “possession”: after all, one 
does not physically pick up knowledge in their hand. Storing memories is not exactly the same as 
storing real books (if it was, surely the distribution of photocopied handouts would have been far 
more successful in Higher Education over the years). Indeed, as Paul Mason has argued (2015), 
in an age where digital files can be infinitely reproduced, premising possession on scarcity – one 
has it or one doesn’t – ceases to make sense. Instead, in all of the cases above possession serves 
as a practical – and highly traditional – illustrative structure. It is, in this sense, not just a 
description but also a trope in which certain conditions for understanding are established via the 
imagery of possession. Key to the effect of this trope is a binary rhetoric: one possesses 
something, or one does not, just as one has knowledge, or one does not. Hence, when we read 
that “science reduces the stupid,” we are clearly not meant to ponder on those parts of the history 
of science we would now think of as “stupid,” and whether that should be considered a longer-
term part of the reduction. In this sense, such non-stupidity is both historical, in that it follows a 
temporal path in achieving its goals, whilst also being outside of history (both because its focus 
on “fact” contests the hermeneutic effective-historical consciousness of a situated horizon, and 
because the achievement of its goal is always assumed: a vaccine, a herd immunity, etc.). This is 
what Vattimo and Zabala once referred to as “the Winner’s History” (2011, pp. 37-39): it was, 
because it was always going to be.  
 
In this sense, we may well stop and pause before the assumed “completion” at work in the 
narrative structure of ignorance’s journey to knowledge. Gadamer’s account of the horizon and 
fore-understanding allows us to unpick some of the problems with this binary rhetoric; in 
particular, the modality of what Gadamer refers to, following Scheler, as “knowledge as 
domination,” (2004, p. 447) which hermeneutics is opposed to. Instead, the responsibility of the 
hermeneutic encounter is to establish the relationships between the kind of ignorance or stupidity 
in play, and the wider concerns around expertise and methodological rigour. It is precisely the 
domain of the commonplace – the enthymeme, the sensus communis, the internet meme – in 
which the persuasive work of the tropes underlying claims to understanding are at their most 
effective, but also at their most bare in terms of the limits they reveal. 
 
At the same time, while Gadamer’s argument that fore-standing determines our sense of how this 
journey can or will be completed, there is reason for caution around moving from this general 
account of ignorance as constitutive of knowledge, and what is at stake in the specific COVID-
related invocations of stupidity, and of knowledge production in the time of pandemic. The 
caution revolves around this: for Gadamer, “a person who has an horizon knows the relative 
significance of everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small” (2004, p. 
301). In this way, our understanding is formed out of an acknowledgement of our ignorance, the 
gaps or incompletions in our horizons, which requires a necessary open-ness to other horizons: 
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“working out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right horizon of inquiry for the 
questions evoked by the encounter with tradition” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 302). This knowledge of 
significance is especially important to the clinician-patient relationship, and why Gadamer aligns 
medicine with rhetoric, with both requiring to know when to speak and when to remain silent, 
and “the right kinds of discourse to exercise an effect on the soul in the right kinds of way” 
(Gadamer, 1996, p. 41). I have suggested earlier in this paper, though, that while the interpreter 
being aware of the relative significance of what is within their horizon, it is precisely the 
formative aspects of knowledge which are both pointedly insignificant yet banally effective 
which trouble the simplicity of this “journey” from ignorance to knowledge. Not only is this a 
symptom of Han’s “achievement society” – where interpretation is less a dialogue and more a 
constant curation of information exchange – but furthermore, within the COVID-19 pandemic 
specifically, it is the question of significance which underlies the very effectiveness of certain 
public health interventions: from what constitutes a significant number of deaths or vaccinations, 
to how significant leaving one’s house twice for exercise or washing the car during national 
lockdown. In this way, one might suggest that, if only for the moment, measures such as national 
lockdowns which affect the entire experience of being (see Žižek, 2020, p. 129) raise some 
interesting problems for Gadamer’s account of “relative significance” as differentiated from the 
insignificant, and consequently the understanding of one’s horizon from the open-ness to others, 
into question. As such, I think there is more to say about the construction of an interpretative 
horizon and the specific way in which stupidity is playing its role within the pandemic.  
 
Models of the Non-stupid, or “Colonial Interpretation” 
 
In his critique of the UK’s handling of the pandemic, John Ashton points out that the discourse 
around the virus has been dominated by limited forms of knowledge; namely, laboratory-based 
epidemiology and data modelling (2020, p. 213). In the main body that advises the UK 
government, the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), there is a notable absence 
of public health experts, as well as historians of disease outbreak and anthropologists, whom 
Ashton argues would provide lived context – particularly of the interconnection between health, 
economy and society – for interventions.  
 
The issue I want to take from this observation is not to question which discipline is best suited to 
support the COVID response, but rather how a narrow model of “knowledge” affects the 
interpretations of stupidity under consideration. This, I think, suggests the adoption of a 
particular model of immunology which, unlike Han’s account, is intrinsically related to both 
practices of health intervention and its requirements of “knowledge”: that is, how the binary 
relationship between knowledge and ignorance is figured. Whereas Foucault described 
immunology in terms of disciplinary institutions, this re-introduced immunology, 
idiosyncratically placed within technologies that have, if Han is correct, outgrown it, can be 
described in terms of interpretative horizons that have already internalised the recognition of 
what is “significant” and what is not. 
 
It seems clear that a reliance on a narrow horizon of expertise risks what Charles Mills once 
referred to, in the context of race relations, as a “closed circuit of epistemic authority” (2007, p. 
34), whereby the structures of approval reinforce their own narratives. Politically, when 
governments in the midst of a pandemic argue that they are “following the science” or being 
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“guided by the data,” the singularity of this claim – the science, the data – insists on a binary line 
between official intelligence and what might be cast as “alternative facts.” The question becomes 
fixed on whether the science says x or y; or whether this science is better than that science (for 
example: the science of herd immunity versus elimination strategies). Within a digital 
mediasphere where both the data is there, alongside any number of YouTube conspiracy theories 
and re-presentations of that evidence, the circuit of epistemic authority is only closed tighter: 
regardless of whether I am supportive of COVID interventions or suspicious of them, I am right 
because of the data, and the data makes me right.   
 
This is why Chris Anderson’s polemic that the transparency and availability of data would lead 
to “the end of theory” – “with enough data, the numbers speak for themselves” (quoted in Han, 
2017, p. 58) – is troubled precisely by the prevalence of so much information. For the “right data” 
to be identified as such, interpretation frequently falls back on the traditional means of 
demarcating truth from everyday thinking, even when the complexities of “post-truth” 
problematize such means. We are therefore left with an awkward juxtaposition of a complicated 
pandemic in need of complicated answers (research, policy, intervention, vaccine, and longer 
term social measures) next to a brute and simplistic view of stupidity. Yet this is not just an 
unfortunate by-product of internet aggression, or a careless insult used once too many times. The 
themes that we have identified so far – embedding facts in a system of elite institutional practices, 
the alignment of intelligence with possession, the spread of knowledge as a moral duty through 
tropes of journey and travel, and an aggressive distinction between all of these and an under-
developed, “stupid” other – all echo a spirit of interpretation that utilises the notion of ignorance 
as core to its own value, a spirit which we might have once described as colonialist. Such an 
interpretative colonialism borrows the motifs of binary distinctions (civilised versus stupid) and 
traversing borders (the “journey” of knowledge about COVID, and specifically of vaccinations, 
is expected to consolidate in the Global North before finding its way to the poorer nations).  
 
Stupidity thus becomes not only a display of ignorance, or an act of immorality, but one of 
barbarity: a wilful destruction of evidence, and consequently the health of a population. 
Barbarity, as we know, is the hallmark of the barbarian: a term originally coined for those who 
did not speak Greek in the classical world, the name mocking the uncivilised noises that came 
from their mouths. In the history of stupidity, insults are always intertwined with interpretative 
strategies. There is also a colonial resonance with the nostalgia for interpretative certainty, and 
indeed the tropes which present ignorance and stupidity as mere steps towards their obliteration – 
journeys, possession, binary moral choice – are imposed at the expense of the tensions and 
contradictions within the pandemic’s social, cultural, and political effects. If such nostalgia may 
appear anachronistic within the present context, it is supported only by the revelations which 
repeat the legacy of real history: that the impact of COVID-19 up racial and social disparities 
(see, for example, Greenaway et al., 2020; Nafilyan et al., 2021; Van Dyke et al., 2021); or that 
the line between legislation to prevent the spread of the virus and the curtailing of civil rights and 
protests is often difficult to discern (see Civicus Monitor, 2020). Indeed, if the “reducing the 
stupid” that was promised turns out to be what Vattimo and Zabala describe as “nothing else than 
the ‘silencing’ of other interlocutors through an apparent dialogue,” then “truth and violence will 
become interchangeable” (2011, p. 19). 
 
It’s a Pandemic, Stupid 




These are all big issues to pass over so quickly. My suggestion here is merely that these echoes 
of the colonial seem to order the significant from the insignificant of an interpretative horizon, at 
a time when making that judgement is increasingly difficult. Furthermore, the difficulty of 
making this judgement is rooted in part in the inevitable link between the politics of health (how 
to deal with the pandemic) and the politics of expertise (how to deal with post-truth, alternative 
facts and fake news), as well as in part a consequence of attempting to think through 
immunology in the context of public health, when, as Han suggested at the start of this paper, 
immunology is no longer the appropriate modality for understanding a late-capitalist 
“achievement society” of digital communication networks.  
 
But what do we do when confronted with genuine ignorance or misdirected understanding – be 
this a person travelling too far from their home, a patient refusing a vaccine, or a protestor 
outside of a clinic warning of global conspiracies? The answer is clearly not found in the 
imperative for people to simply make their own minds up (or “do your own research!” as below-
the-line comments so frequently call for). This would merely continue the models of possession 
and choice lying at the heart of the traditional disdain for ignorance, which we have already 
called into question. Likewise, any banal recourse to liberal rights (“everyone has the right to an 
opinion,” etc.) or arguments about negative freedom (“who are we to call another person 
stupid?”) should be dismissed, because rights are not the ethical problem at hand. Nor would this 
answer address the obvious need for speed and urgency in public health responses to the 
pandemic. I take as granted that, in such times, collective and unified responses by a population 
are more effective and preferable. The risk, though, is that a binary model of knowledge as 
possession overlooks the production of knowledge, not in terms of interpreting the “evidence” or 
“data” (which is where COVID conspiracies speak at odds with government advisors using the 
same language), but rather in terms of the flow and circulation of interpretation at work in any 
form of understanding.  
 
This is the nub of the issue. When deployed in public health debates, it becomes clear that the 
accusation of stupidity carries an interpretative commitment that goes beyond a simple 
identification of lack of knowledge. Instead it becomes a key trope for maintaining certain 
economies of practice which are, in turn, embedded within a range of contexts that can and 
should be questioned. Paul and Haddad thus rightly note that dismissing (or ignoring) ignorance 
can be significant. “A merely defensive move animated by the desire to restore the shattered 
fabric of science and policy is […] not enough” (2019, p. 300, my emphasis). Instead, attempting 
to reconstruct the hermeneutic horizons in play can bring into focus the ways in which this trope 
moves so easily through matters of applied health to wider political and epistemological 
concerns. In this sense, it is perfectly reasonable to accept that accusations of stupidity are 
effectively throwaway insults, and that the study of memes and on-line debates are perhaps the 
least significant concerns in the current global health situation. My argument is simply that what 
is considered insignificant in one’s horizon – whether this be social psychologists using students 
in experiments, the ways in which immunological models support approaches to epistemology, 
or the uncomfortable resonances with past cultural practices of domination – can yet be telling, 
precisely because of its insignificance.  
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If these insignificances are what are passed over in silence when stupidity is invoked, then 
engaging with them may offer alternative ways to speak about the experience of an 
immunological struggle in an achievement society. And this, I think, is an issue: when we insist 
on the primacy of knowledge as a possessed determinant of morality, what we lack is a way of 
speaking which falls in-between knowing and not-knowing. Not quite Han’s idiot, but more a 
way of articulating experiences within and beyond the pandemic which are not as easy to 
categorise as “other” or “alienated” along the traditional immunological models of society. This 
would be to interpret what one might fear in a vaccine, or how one may feel about distance from 
loved ones, when the pandemic has inflicted an excess of same-ness: from the dreary repetition 
of lockdown to the same public health problems and socio-cultural inequalities. It would also 
involve the mindfulness of what broader structures and politics of meaning – and their effective 
histories – are invoked when insisting, through a throwaway meme or in-depth research paper, 
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